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Lawson identifies three approaches to philosophical under-labouring: demystifying in-
consistencies, unrefl ected-upon assumptions and confusions in any knowledge activity
(such as science, common-sense or everyday thinking); informing scientists of the nature
of contributions to knowledge (in the discipline and across disciplines); and method-
facilitating functions, by clarifying the conditions under which given methods are appro-
priate. Lawson also argues that philosophical under-labouring has been a central part of
the project of critical realism in economics (on which see Lawson, 1997, 2003) where
much effort has gone into investigating and clarifying concepts as well as the underlying
assumptions of economic theory.
My thesis, to repeat, is that Sen’s critique of mainstream welfare economics and
mainstream economic theory can also be seen as a philosophical under-labouring exercise
of a similar sort. Sen’s contribution is essentially concerned with providing the ground for
economic science, rather than with substantive analysis per se. One of the most significant
aspects of Sen’s work is the clarification of social categories such as rationality, choice,
agency, advantage, freedoms, potentialities and capabilities from a philosophical point
of view, opening up new perspectives for economic analysis.
Now, even though I want to argue that Sen’s contribution is essentially a philosophical
under-labouring exercise, it is also true that Sen does not engage in explicit ontological
analysis at the same level of abstraction as, for example, critical realism in economics. For
even though Sen philosophically under-labours such categories as capability and fun-
ctioning, among others, the more general ontological properties of the latter features are
often left implicit in the discussion, and not elaborated. I shall suggest that it is useful to
draw upon an explicitly socio-ontological perspective, in order to systematise the more
general ontological commitments of Sen’s approach.
To undertake such a task, I shall resort to Tony Lawson’s conception of social ontology.
I do so because I regard it as the best (defended) account of social ontology available. Here,
I shall not repeat its various defences (on this, see Lawson, 1997, 2003, or Fleetwood,
1999), but use its results as a resource. Furthermore, adopting this strategy is advanta-
geous because while other authors who undertake ontological analysis are concerned with
science in general, Lawson’s approach is focused on economics and the social realm in
particular. Thus Lawson’s analysis can be easily used to address Sen’s work, for both are
mainly concerned with the same field of enquiry.
In addition to the argument that Sen’s capability approach is essentially a philosophical
under-labouring exercise, in which Sen elaborates categories such as capability, function-
ing, advantage and well-being, I shall also discuss the more general ontological commit-
ments of the capability approach which are left implicit in Sen’s discussion. Specifically,
I shall argue that Sen’s emphasis on capabilities and potentials can be fruitfully interpreted
as part of an ontology of ‘causal powers’. I elaborate upon the notion of causal powers, and
will argue that Sen’s notion of ‘capabilities’ is best interpreted as a particular specification
of the ontological category of ‘causal power’.
The ethical implications of the capability approach have received much attention, since
the capability approach was introduced within the context of ethical analysis. But the
capability approach also has an ontological role, and points to a conception of causal
powers. In Section 1, I provide a brief sketch of Sen’s capability approach and, in Section 2,
I argue that the capability approach is essentially an ontological exercise. In Section 3,
I discuss the various levels of abstraction that an ontological exercise can have, and suggest
Tony Lawson’s social ontology as an ontological exercise which can fruitfully complement
Sen’s analysis, for the two projects operate at different levels of abstraction.
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In Section 4, I describe Lawson’s structured ontology and, in Section 5, I argue that Sen’s
capability approach is underpinned by an ontology of causal powers in line with Lawson’s
structured ontology, and that Sen’s approach leads to an open system conception of reality.
In Section 6, I explain why the suggested interpretation of the capability approach bears the
implication that the philosophical and methodological underpinnings of the capability
approach are significantly different from those of contemporary mainstream economics.
In Section 7, I argue that this open system conception of reality is also present in
Sen’s writings on rationality and choice while, in Section 8, I argue that: (i) Sen’s view of
development processes is underpinned by a conception of reality similar to Lawson’s; (ii)
interpreting Sen’s capability approach in the light of Lawson’s structured ontology shows
that structural transformation is the means to capability enlargement; (iii) Sen’s and
Lawson’s perspective are to a great extent complementary, for both are concerned essen-
tially with philosophical under-labouring, though working at different levels of abstraction.
1. The capability approach
In his capability approach, Sen argues that the appropriate space to assess well-being is
not utility or goods or commodities or even resources. While the latter are only a means
to well-being, the former (i.e., utility), in any of its various interpretations (happiness,
desire satisfaction or actual choice) reflects a subjective mental metric which does not
capture real welfare or deprivation (for example, because the subjective preferences of a
person might become adapted to a worse situation). Rather, well-being must be analysed
in the space of human functionings. These human functionings are the person’s actual
achievements, that is, what a person is or does.
Sen distinguishes well-being and advantage as two distinct concepts. While well-being
refers to actual achievement, advantage refers to potential achievement. So the appropriate
space in which to judge human advantage and inequality is not that of actual (achieved)
functionings—for these only reflect well-being –but rather the space of potential fun-
ctionings. Sen names this set of potential functionings as ‘capabilities’. Capabilities are
thus potentials, which can be actualised, and well-being will depend on the particular
functionings that are actualised (that a person achieves).
Sen’s view that human advantage and equality should be assessed in the space of poten-
tial well-being is a perspective that contrasts with the focus on actual utilities or resources
that pervades mainstream welfare economics. Against this perspective, Sen (1999B, 2002)
has consistently placed freedom to achieve (capability) as the central category of his analysis.
Now, it is important to note that Sen’s conceptionof freedom is not exhaustedby the notion
ofnegative freedom, i.e., freedomfromconstraints. Senalso stresses that freedom is important
as freedomtobeand todo.Sen’s conceptionof freedomisonewhere the capabilityor power to
achievemust be a real possibility. Sen argues that even ‘valuating negative freedommust have
somepositive implication’ (Sen, 1984, p. 313), and hence advocates that a correct conception
of freedom cannot disregard the positive aspect of freedom. Sen writes:
I have found it more useful to see ‘positive freedom’ as the person’s ability to do the things
in question taking everything into account (including external restraints as well as internal
limitations) . . . This way of seeing positive freedom is not the one preferred by [Isaiah] Berlin, but
it is close to the characterisation presented by T.H. Green: ‘We do not meanmerely freedom from
restraint or compulsion . . . When we speak of freedom as something so highly priz ed, we mean
a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying’. (Sen, 2002,
pp. 586–7, emphasis in original)
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The aim of Sen with his capability approach is to elaborate upon a conception where the
emphasis is on real and positive powers, capacities and capabilities as potentials, rather
than actualities.
Now, I shall argue that, in advancing these concepts, Sen is effectively undertaking
a philosophical under-labouring exercise, in which ontological categories are elaborated. In
the next section I shall further explain this claim.
2. Ontology and philosophical under-labouring
I shall start by clarifyingmy terms. By ‘ontology’ I mean an enquiry into the nature of being.
Social ontology is a concern with social being, where the latter refers to the part of reality
whose existence depends at least in part upon us (see Lawson, 1997, 2003). This enquiry
can be undertaken in order to understand the nature of specific social entities or, at a more
abstract level, to determine the general properties of these entities and of social reality.
An example may be useful to understand the distinction between ontology and scientific
theories. A positive correlation between money supply and the level of prices constitutes
an empirical observation. A scientific theory would be a theory that would explain such
an empirical observation: for example, a theory about a causal mechanism or structure
through which a higher level of money supply causes a higher level of prices. But onto-
logical analysis is aimed not at analysing how a specific mechanism or structure causes
actual events, but rather at understanding the nature of the entities posited in scientific
theories. For example, an enquiry aimed at understanding the nature of money—and not
an explanation of a specific causal mechanism through which money influences prices—
would be deemed ontological.
Of course, an ontological analysis of the nature of money (or of any entity) would
certainly include an analysis of its properties (for example causal properties), which in turn
play a role in the scientific theories about money. Ontological analysis and scientific
theories are strongly interrelated: scientific theories draw upon the entities analysed at an
ontological level, and the successes or failures of scientific theories are extremely important
to assess the validity of the ontological presuppositions of scientific theories. But ontology
and science are two different, even though interrelated, exercises. Ontology is a study of
the nature of reality, including the entities presupposed by scientists and the properties of
such entities at a more general level, while science analyses more specific causal structures
and mechanisms and the manner in which actual events are brought about.
With this in mind, one can see why Sen’s capability approach is an ontological exercise.
The capability approach is not aimed at understanding specific causal mechanisms through
which human advantage and well-being can be fostered. Rather, the fundamental concerns
of Sen’s capability approach are questions such as ‘what is advantage’ or ‘what is well-being’.
Sen’s main goal is to elaborate such categories as ‘well-being’, ‘advantage’, ‘development’,
‘capabilities’ and ‘functionings’, among others, in order to understand what they mean, and
to determine their general causal properties (not to develop a scientific theory about specific
causal mechanisms that can be posited using these categories).
Sen’s aim is to under-labour philosophically for science (by elaborating upon social
categories to be used in specific theories), not to do science (to develop specific scientific
theories). It is widely recognised that Sen’s capability approach is not a specific social
theory. In fact, Sen’s capability approach has often been accused of not being specific
enough (see, for example, Nussbaum, 2003). But the ontological nature of Sen’s
contribution has received little (if any) attention. Rather, the capability approach has
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been interpreted as being only an ethical theory. Hilary Putnam (2002), for example,
argues that Sen’s perspective is concerned with bringing ethics back to economics, while
taking ethics to exclude any concern with ontology (see also Putnam, 2004).
The capability approach can indeed be fruitfully used for ethical analysis. In fact, it
is aimed at providing a space for the assessment of equality. But this is achieved by means
of an ontological exercise, and not through ethical theorising. The context in which the
capability approach was introduced was an ethical debate, in which Sen criticised neo-
classical welfare economics on the one hand, and the Rawlsian emphasis on primary goods
on the other. But the main contribution of the capability approach was to provide an
informational basis to assess inequality, not to provide an ethical theory or a theory of
justice, as Sen notes.
The theories Sen criticised when introducing the capability approach were ethical
theories. Rawls, for example, not only suggested the space of primary goods, as he also
chose a prescriptive criterion to combine with such a space—the maximin criterion. For
Rawls, the prescriptive question of ‘what should be done’ was a crucial one, hence the need
to provide the prescriptive criterion that the level of primary goods to be maximised was
the level of primary goods of the worst-off individual (the maximin criterion). But Sen,
unlike Rawls, did not provide a prescriptive criterion in his capability approach. In Sen’s
capability approach, the important question was not the prescriptive question of ‘what
should be done’, but rather ontological questions (‘what is advantage and well-being’, etc.).
Sen’s aim was to provide descriptions of the concepts under analysis. These can of
course be used for ethical theorising and for more substantive analysis. Ontological de-
scription and ethical prescription can be mutually enriching and complementary. One
must distinguish between a vision of ethics without ontology, where the exclusive concern
is with prescriptive criteria, and an integrated view of ethics and ontology, where evaluation
is much concerned with the description of categories such as ‘well-being’, ‘advantage’,
‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ from an ontological point of view. Nevertheless, ontolog-
ical description and ethical prescription are still different exercises, and Sen’s capability
approach is concerned with the former, not with the latter.
3. Ontology and the level of abstraction
Now, as it was said before, ontology can be aimed at analysing which entities constitute
social being or, at a more abstract level, which are the general properties of those entities
and of social reality. The former analysis is termed scientific ontology by Lawson (2005),
for it is typically concerned with the entities posited by scientific theories (even though it
can be extended to cover entities other than those posited by scientific theories). The latter
is distinguished as philosophical ontology, for it is concerned with the properties of entities
at a philosophical or more general level. Sen’s capability approach can be seen as a
contribution to scientific ontology, to the extent that it scrutinises entities such as ‘well-
being’, ‘advantage’, ‘functioning’ or ‘capability’, among others. In contrast, explicitly
philosophical-ontological contributions typically go to a higher degree of abstraction, en-
gaging in the analysis not only of the entities that constitute social being, but also of the
more general properties of social being.
One example of contributions to philosophical ontology (that is, undertaken at the
above-mentioned higher level of abstraction) can be found in the work of Lawson (1997,
2003), and in several contributions to the economic literature systematised under the
heading of critical realism in economics. In these contributions, while the ontological
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analysis of more substantive social categories such as ‘money’, ‘institution’ or ‘devel-
opment’ is surely an important part, the main emphasis (at least so far) has been on the
more general properties of social being: for example, properties such as structure, causality,
interconnectivity, openness/closure, among others. In the work of Lawson, for example,
the social realm is characterised as being structured, interconnected (that is, its constit-
uents are highly relational), emergent, dynamic and open.
Sen’s capability approach is not concerned with this level of abstraction; and Lawson
does not provide an ontological analysis of more substantive entities such as ‘functioning’
and ‘capability’. In the same way that ontology and scientific theories differ in the level
of abstraction (the latter is concerned with how specific mechanisms cause actual events,
and the former is concerned with the nature of the entities posited in science), even within
ontological analysis, there can be lower levels of abstraction (for example, Sen’s char-
acterisation of more concrete entities such as ‘functioning’ and ‘capability’) and higher
levels of abstraction (for example, Lawson’s description of such general properties of the
social realm as structure, interconnectivity, openness, among others). This is captured by
Lawson’s (2005) distinction between scientific and philosophical ontology.
Nevertheless, the analysis of entities such as ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ implies
some conception of the properties that such entities possess. When discussing the nature of
a functioning and of a capability, Sen makes some implicit presuppositions about whether
a process of human development (characterised in terms of the expansion of the person’s
capabilities) is structured or not, interconnected or atomistic, open or closed, and so forth.
In order to understand these ontological commitments that Sen makes, I draw upon the
social (philosophical) ontology of Tony Lawson.
In fact, Sen’s and Lawson’s approaches can be seen as complementary, for they are
undertaken at different levels of abstraction, i.e., scientific ontology and philosophical
ontology, respectively. So far, my main claim was that Sen’s capability approach is an
exercise in scientific ontology, aimed at describing categories such as well-being, potential
well-being, functionings, capabilities and development, among others. The second claim
to be made now will be that, while Sen does not explicitly elaborate upon the more general
properties of these categories (at the level of philosophical ontology), he has nevertheless
an implicit conception of these properties, which is similar to the critical realist one. I shall
turn to this second claim now. I shall start by providing a sketch of Lawson’s social
ontology.
4. Powers, structures and open systems
According to Lawson’s (1997, 2003) structured ontology, reality is constituted by struc-
tures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies, in addition to actual events and states of affairs,
and their perception and impression. Structures are the underlying conditions of possibility
that enable or facilitate the occurrence of a given phenomenon. Structures comprise powers
that may or may not be exercised and, when exercised, may or may not be actualised in
actual events and states of affairs. M echanisms refer to the mode of operation of structures
and exist as the power that a structure possesses of acting in a given way. This operation of
mechanisms, when exercised, triggers forces into motion, which Lawson names tendencies.
The term ‘tendency’ is meant to capture the idea of a continuous activity that may or may
not be actualised in concrete events and states of affairs, even when it is continuously
exercised.
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These structures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies constitute the underlying causes
of observed events. From this perspective, to view causality as a constant conjunction
between events does not give an adequate account of reality. The aim of science should
rather be to understand which structures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies are
responsible for specific events.
It is important to note that both generative mechanisms and tendencies are themselves
causal powers of a structure: mechanisms exist as the power that a structure possesses to
act in a given way, while a tendency occurs as a causal power is (or many causal powers are)
continuously exercised. For this reason, I shall often refer to structures and causal powers
only, adopting a broad conception of the latter that encompasses mechanisms and
tendencies as well.
Notice that the claim that observable events are caused by underlying structures, causal
powers and tendencies does not mean that the latter can be directly read off from
experience. Rather, this is a transfactual claim about causal powers that can be exercised
whatever events are observed: a claim about the operation of structures and causal powers,
regardless of whether this operation necessarily produces observable (actual) event
regularities.
Let me refer now to the distinction between closed systems and open systems. According
to Lawson, closed systems are systems in which constant conjunctions of the form
‘whenever event X then event Y’ occur. Systems in which these constant conjunctions
do not always occur are open systems. In Lawson’s perspective, science is concerned
with the causal powers, capacities and dispositions that objects possess. These causal
powers may or may not be exercised, and when exercised, may or may not be actualised.
Unless these causal powers always manifest themselves in a constant, isolated or
predictable way, the reality under analysis will constitute an open system, (see Lawson,
1997, 2003).
In Lawson’s conception, as we have seen, powers or capacities are explained in terms of
underlying structures. Structures can be physical, biological, psychological or social
structures. In Lawson’s ontology, social structures are constituted by social rules, which are
attached to given social positions. And social positions are internally related. As Lawson
explains, ‘[a]spects or items are said to be internally related when they are what they are, or
can do what they do, by virtue of the relations in which they stand’ (Lawson, 2003, p. 17).
When parts of a given phenomenon are internally related, these parts in isolation will not
possess the essential properties of the whole. These (internally related) social positions
(that are attached to given social rules) constitute the underlying social structure that
facilitates or constrains human agency and social practices.
Another important concept to be introduced at this stage is that of emergence. Lawson
explains that ‘[e]mergence may be defined as a relationship between two features or aspects
such that one arises out of the other and yet, while perhaps being capable of reacting back
on it, remains causally and taxonomically irreducible to it’ (Lawson, 1997, p. 63). It can be
the case that objects are interrelated in a structure in such a way that higher level
properties, which can be powers or potentials, arise out of the lower level activity, but
nevertheless nothing in the lower level activity could enable the prediction of such higher
level properties.
When the object of our analysis is structured in such a complex way as described above
(including internal relations and emergence), the causal powers that arise out of this
structure will typically entail an open system conception of reality, for these causal powers
will most likely not be manifest in a constant, isolated or even predictable way.
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5. Capabilities and open systems
Capabilities, like causal powers in general, are not actualities—they are potentials that
may or may not be exercised and/or actualised. And similarly to causal powers, capabilities
arise by virtue of underlying physical, biological, psychological or social structures which
facilitate or constrain a particular achievement or functioning. Furthermore, the set of
functionings that are actually achieved by a person is the actualisation of a power (or
potential).
Now, I want to argue that Sen’s capability approach not only allows for an open system
conception of reality, as it effectively suggests such a conception. It is easy to see why Sen’s
emphasis on capabilities as potentials allows for an open system conception of reality.
Potentials may or may not be exercised and/or actualised in a permanent way and, even
when exercised and actualised, they need not deliver the constant regularities that are
typical of a closed system.
Of course, one may wonder why causal powers, capabilities and potentials will necessarily
lead to an open system conception or reality. In fact, it does not necessarily follow that
they will entail an open system conception of reality—powers, capabilities or any sort of
potentials may be permanently actualised in stable event regularities. One can argue, for
example, that, at least in some situations, the causal powers of an object may be relatively
constant, or not manifest, or insufficiently isolated to be identified (without experimental
control). If, however, capabilities, potentials, powers or capacities can be permanently
actualised in event regularities (or never actualised at all), thus generating a closed system,
why must Sen’s capability approach lead to an open system conception of reality?
The point to note is that Sen’s emphasis on capabilities and functionings makes sense
only in the context of an open system. And this is so because capabilities, potentials,
powers or capacities would be irrelevant for any analysis if they were always actualised in
a closed system, or if they were never actualised at all. Notions such as capability, potential,
power or capacity are relevant only if they may or may not be actualised in different
circumstances, in an open system.
If capabilities, causal powers or potentials, were never actualised, it is obvious that they
would be irrelevant for our analysis. If, on the other hand, capabilities, causal powers or
potentials were permanently actualised as a constant conjunction of events (a possibility
that can never be excluded a priori)—and thus closed systems would be ubiquitous—then
the very notion of potential, power or capacity would become superfluous to scientific
explanation. If causal powers were permanently exercised as a constant conjunction of
events, it would be enough for science to undertake correlation analysis in order to obtain
regularities between those events. It is only the fact that causal powers may or may not be
exercised, and when exercised may or may not be actualised, within the context of an open
system that makes these concepts important and necessary to scientific explanation.
Moreover, note that if capabilities and causal powers were permanently actualised in
event regularities within a closed system, there would be little, if any, scope to discriminate
and identify the underlying powers, potentials or capacities that were causing the observed
event regularities. Causal powers are identified just when contrasting situations are ob-
served, where the fact that different powers may or may not be actualised enables scientists
to discriminate and identify them. But if powers are permanently actualised in event
regularities, they become indistinguishable from the event regularities they generate, and
thus superfluous for our analysis—for the corresponding event regularities would suffice as
an account of causality.
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So if the capability approach, or any approach that suggests the analysis of potentials
(or causal powers), is to be of any relevance, it must presuppose an open system conception
of reality. Otherwise (i.e., under a closed system conception of reality), analysis of actual
regularities (and achieved welfare) would suffice, rendering the very concept of capability
as potential functioning superfluous.
Furthermore, as will be argued later on, a scrutiny of Sen’s contributions in various
areas—such as his writings on rationality and on development processes—shows that this
open systems (and causal powers) view underpins other aspects of Sen’s work as well, and
reinforces this point. Throughout his contributions, Sen’s emphasis has always been on the
centrality of freedom to understand human agency and advantage. I shall return to this
point in the next three sections.
6. The methodology of modern mainstream economics
Sen’s perspective has been criticised on the grounds that it does not really go beyond
the traditional mainstream approach to economics. Bernard Guerrien, for example, argues
that ‘Amartya Sen, as an economist, is a standard microeconomist (that is what he was
awarded the Nobel Prize for): only the vocabulary is different (‘‘capabilities’’, ‘‘func-
tionings’’, etc.)’ (Guerrien, 2002).
Emmanuelle Benicourt, in a similar vein, writes
when Sen explicitly describes his system (particularly in Commodities and Capabilities, 1985),
it becomes clear that it is just a variation of the mainstream approach. Instead of reasoning in
terms of an n-dimensional space composed of ‘commodities’ (goods or utilities), Sen proposes
a space of ‘functionings’. (Benicourt, 2002)
The question one might ask, then, is whether Sen’s emphasis on ‘powers’ and ‘capabilities’
as ‘potential functionings’ brings something that is not provided by the mainstream
approach to economics. Do these concepts refer to something that is substantially different
from the usual categories of the mainstream approach? I shall argue that Sen’s capability
approach is actually very different from the mainstream approach. Sen’s shift to a space of
potentials, powers and capacities ultimately implies radically different philosophical and
methodological underpinnings for economic analysis.
Modern mainstream economic practice is committed to a methodology that, unlike Sen’s
capability approach, is inconsistent with open systems. To the contrary, the use of methods
that presuppose closed systems is one of the central features of modern mainstream
economics. In fact, Lawson (1997, 2003) has argued that the essence ofmodernmainstream
economics is an insistence on methods of mathematical-deductivist modelling, which in
turn presuppose closed systems.
Deductivism is defined by Lawson (2003, p. 5) as ‘a type of explanation in which
regularities of the form ‘‘whenever event x then event y’’ (or stochastic near equivalents) are
a necessary condition’. So deductive models presuppose the existence of closed systems:
for closed systems are precisely defined as those in which to each possible eventX, another
event Y will correspond.
Notice that mainstream economists are often open to competing theories of economic
phenomena. In fact, mainstream economists sometimes claim to have a view of the world
which can be argued to be similar to the critical realist one, where the aim is to find
underlying structures, not empirical correlations (see, for example, Samuelson, 1963).
Nevertheless, this claim is conjoined with the requirement that all analysis of economic
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phenomena (grounded on whatever theory) must be undertaken using a deductive
methodology.
Notice, moreover, that one could argue that the presumption of many mainstream
economists is not that exact regularities are displayed in a straightforward way in reality.
One could argue that their view is rather that whatever complexity reality has, it can
ultimately be understood using deductive models. Furthermore, the use of these methods,
which presuppose exact event regularities, is often argued (by mainstream economists) to
be an advantage of this mainstream approach over other economic (and sociological)
traditions.
It must be conceded that the possibility of explaining some particular reality using
methods that presuppose closed systems cannot be excluded a priori. The validity of a
deductive methodology can only be refuted after it is inferred a posteriori that the conditions
of possibility of some generalised features of experience are inconsistent with deductive
methods (because a closed system does not obtain).
In an open system, however, exact event regularities must be generated by means of
experimental control (as is the case in natural sciences). Otherwise, deductive methods will
severely constrain any explanatory procedure aimed at analysing an open system, where
powers, capacities and potentials do not permanently manifest themselves in a constant
and predictable way.
The point I should like to stress at this stage is not that social reality is an open system
(although I believe it is; on this, see Lawson, 1997, 2003). What I want to emphasise is
that, rightly or wrongly, modern mainstream economics (including mainstream welfare
economics) relies on a methodology that is inconsistent with open systems.
Once this is recognised, one can see why Sen’s capability approach is a perspective the
philosophical and methodological underpinnings of which are radically different from
those of mainstream economic practice. In fact, if one interprets Sen’s notions of ‘primary
powers’ (Sen, 1984) and ‘capabilities as potentials functionings’ as a specification of the
ontological notion of ‘causal powers’, where these allow for, and their analysis and elab-
oration takes for granted, an open systems conception of reality, one can see how this is
a perspective whose implications are very significant not only for welfare economics, but
for economics in general. Since most mainstream economic practice is underpinned by
a methodology that is inconsistent with open systems, Sen’s approach is not just the
‘capability approach to welfare economics’, but the capability ( or causal powers) approach to
economics as a science, an approach where the emphasis is on potentiality, freedom and
openness.
7. Rationality and open systems
The extension of this open systems conception to fields other than welfare economics
is implicitly present even in Sen’s own work—for Sen’s critique of mainstream economics
has arisen in contexts other than welfare economics. Sen has also criticised standard
rational choice theory and (micro)economic theory as an account of human action and
choice. Sen argues against the two dominant perspectives on rational behaviour, which
he describes as the ‘self-interest pursuit’ approach and the ‘internal consistency’ approach.
In the former approach, human choice is always explained as a pursuit of self-interested
goals (which are represented by a complete preference ordering). Sen shows how this
approach omits many important determinants of human choice other than self-interest,
such as social rules, moral imperatives, moral sentiments, conventional rule following or
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social commitment (see Sen, 1997), and he also argues that the joint outcome of these
complex reasons for choice need neither conform to the posited self-interested preference
ordering of the agent nor even deliver exact regularities of observed behaviour.
In the ‘internal consistency’ approach, on the other hand, every choice is again explained
in terms of an underlying complete preference ordering (as in the ‘self-interest pursuit’
approach), but now this preference ordering is ‘revealed’ in choice (instead of simply pos-
ited initially as a representation of the self-interest of the human agent), and so is inferred
from observed behaviour. Sen criticises this approach on the grounds that conditions of
internal consistency do not typically occur in human behaviour, i.e., exact regularities of
actual behaviour do not typically obtain.
Sen notes how both these approaches (i.e., the ‘self-interest pursuit’ approach, and the
‘internal consistency’ approach) ultimately aim at obtaining an account of rational be-
haviour that enables prediction of actual behaviour. This is achieved by: first describing
rational behaviour in an exact and predictable way (for example, according to a complete
preference ordering of competing options); and, second, supposing that rational behaviour
coincides with (or at least approximates) actual behaviour (Sen also notes how these
approaches are often conflated, for the binary relation of revealed preference is often
defined as the binary relation of self-interested preferences).
Sen has criticised the mainstream view that rational choice theory and economic
theory should aim at prediction of actual behaviour (see Sen, 1982, 1987, 1997, 2002; also
Meeks, 1991), arguing also against the assumption that human agents permanently behave
according to some complete and exact preference ordering. In fact, Sen (2002) proposes
an alternative conception of rationality, according to which the term means the discipline
(and the need) of engaging in reasoned scrutiny of goals and values at any time (even
though this discipline is not permanently exercised). Sen (1997) even argues that pre-
ference orderings are very often incomplete, i.e., there can be two options A and B such that
the human agent neither prefers one to the other, nor is indifferent between them. Rather,
these two options are not ranked in any way vis-a`-vis each other, and the choice made by
the human agent can be any of them.
This is a view that contrasts with the mainstream account of choice as the outcome of
optimising behaviour according to complete preferences. The conception of human
behaviour of mainstream microeconomic theory is certainly in line with a closed systems
conception, for behaviour is determined by a completely specified (and permanently ex-
ercised) preference ordering. But in Sen’s account of rationality there is no need for this
regularity of behaviour, and human behaviour does not necessarily conform to any sort
of closed system for: preference orderings are incomplete, and rationality does not even
mean to conform to any preference ordering. Rather, Sen’s view presupposes that human
agents always have the freedom, capability or power to choose differently than they did
(where this freedom, capability or power will of course be facilitated or constrained by the
underlying biological and/or social structures upon which the former depend).
This conception of rationality and choice that Sen puts forward, if correct, makes it clear
that human behaviour need not conform to constant or predictable regularities, and hence
the relevant situation will be that of an open system.
8. Causal powers, structural transformation and interconnectedness
So far, it has been argued how Sen’s perspective, of judging human advantage in terms of
their potentials, powers or capabilities (and not in terms of actual well-being), can be
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fruitfully linked to the described (socio)ontology of causal powers, whose philosophical
and methodological underpinnings are radically different from those presupposed by
the methodology of modern mainstream economics. In what follows, I shall try to draw the
policy implications of interpreting Sen’s notion of capabilities as causal powers in the
context of Lawson’s structured ontology. Lawson writes
on the critical realist understanding a feasible aim is to transform real social structures in order
to facilitate alternative opportunities. There thus arises the possibility of enhancing the scope
for human potentials to be realised, of broadening human opportunities; it is feasible to think
in terms of replacing structures that are unwanted, unneeded and restrictive by those that are
wanted, needed and empowering. Choice is no longer denied. On the contrary, it lies within the
realms of policy objectives to aim to widen the scope of choice, with respect, in particular, to
options that are both needed and desired. (Lawson, 1997, p. 277)
Sen’s capability approach has many similarities with this critical realist perspective on social
emancipation: for both suggest undertaking ethical analysis in a space of human potentials.
But notice that the critical realist point that powers, potentials and capacities arise in virtue
of the way that reality is structured, implies that the means to broaden human potentials,
powers and capacities is structural transformation, as Lawson points out.
This is an important aspect where Lawson’s structured ontology and Sen’s capability
approach can complement each other. If the capability approach points to an ontology
of powers, potentials and capacities, and if in the critical realist structured ontology these
powers, potentials and capacities arise in virtue of underlying structures, then an under-
standing of these structures seems to be crucial if we want to broaden human capabilities
and potential functionings.
Conversely, notice that Sen’s specification of the category of powers as ‘capabilities’
can also help critical realists to address the more concrete and empirical issues that Sen
discusses, such as poverty, development processes and income distribution. Even if
the main emphasis of Sen’s analysis has been on a philosophical under-labouring role, it is
clear that some of his work has also focused on more concrete issues, such as the empirical
analysis of poverty, income distribution and development processes. On the other hand,
other projects that engage in philosophical under-labouring, such as critical realism in
economics, have been much more concerned with explicit and systematic ontological
analysis, not with empirical analysis per se. Furthermore, remember that, even where
philosophical under-labouring is concerned, both approaches have worked at different
levels of abstraction. Sen has been preoccupied with clarifying social categories at a less
abstract level (categories such as ‘well-being’ and ‘advantage’), at the level of scientific
ontology, while critical realism has addressed more general properties of the social realm
such as structure, openness/closure, internal relations, emergence and many others, at the
level of philosophical ontology. So both approaches are complementary and mutually
enriching.
While Sen’s analysis can help critical realists in applying their ontological analysis of
structures and powers to concrete issues, the critical realist explanation of social structures,
as comprising social rules attached to each social position (where these social positions
are internally related), can provide ontological insight into how powers and capacities can
be broadened. The suggestion of structural transformation, in order to broaden human
capacities and potentials, comes from the ontological insight that capacities, powers and
potentials arise by virtue of the way reality is structured. But to understand the way in which
these (internally related) structures are reproduced and/or transformed through human
agency (in a context of open systems) also requires empirical analysis.
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Notice that this open system conception of a structured, interconnected (and internally
related) reality is also implicitly present in Sen’s own analysis of development processes.
The fact that Sen’s work (including his ontological description of the nature of well-being,
advantage, functionings and capabilities) is situated at a more concrete level than critical
realism in economics does not mean that his analysis is not underpinned by implicit
ontological commitments at a more general level. In fact, in his account of development
as freedom, Sen (1999B) argues that development must be seen within the context of
the complex interconnections between (instrumental) freedoms such as ‘political free-
doms’, ‘economic facilities’, ‘social opportunities’, ‘transparency guarantees’ and ‘pro-
tective security’ (Sen, 1999B, p. 38)—and takes these interconnections to be a central part
of his argument, for these factors cannot be analysed as if they were isolated from each
other. Effectively, this more general view of capabilities as causal powers is in line with
Sen’s argument that ‘[t]he capability perspective involves, to some extent, a return to an
integrated approach to economic and social development championed particularly by
Adam Smith’ (Sen, 1999B, p. 294).
Note also that to interpret capabilities as a specification of the ontological category
of causal powers not only leads us to (or at least allows for) an open systems view of reality
(an aspect that also becomes very clear in Sen’s account of freedom, rationality, and
interconnectivity within development processes) but clarifies the role of capabilities as
a ‘means to’ (as opposed to being just the ‘end of’) development. Sen writes:
In looking for a fuller understanding of the role of human capabilities, we have to take note of:
1) their direct relevance to the well-being and freedom of people; 2) their indirect role through
influencing social change; and 3) their indirect role through influencing economic production.
The relevance of the capability perspective incorporates each of these contributions. In contrast,
in the standard literature human capital is seen primarily in terms of the third of the three roles.
(Sen, 1999B, pp. 296–97)
Sen notes how freedom should be viewed as both the ‘primary end’ and the ‘principal
means’ of development (Sen, 1999B, p. 36), naming these roles as the ‘constitutive’ and
the ‘instrumental’ role of freedom (ibid., pp. 36–7).While much attention has been given to
the ethical foundations of the capability approach (concerned with freedom as the ‘primary
end’ of development), the ontological and methodological implications of seeing freedom as
the ‘principal means’ of development have received relatively less attention.
Seeing capabilities as causal powers leads to a better understanding not only of Sen’s
other contributions, but also of the capability approach itself, by showing how freedom
and capability enlargement are not only the ends of development, but also the means. The
capability approach has proved a useful framework in welfare analysis, but as Marianne Hill
notices, has not provided (at least so far) a theory of underlying causes of social processes:
although the capability approach provides a framework for the evaluation of individual and
social welfare, it is not a theory of the social causes of poverty and inequality, nor of the effects
of social institutions on human welfare. In fact, we can link criticisms of the capability approach
to the need to take on the question of how to advance human welfare through social policy.
In particular, we need to expand the capability approach to enable analysis of social institutions
and processes, from the firm to the family and from the market to public policy-making. (Hill,
2003, p. 118)
The suggested interpretation of capabilities as causal powers can be a starting point for an
analysis of social institutions and processes. The capability approach is essentially an
ontological exercise, aimed at clarifying the meaning of categories such as well-being,
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advantage, functionings and capabilities. Once it is recognised that this approach is, at
a more general level, underpinned by a structured ontology of powers and capacities, the
latter can help us to understand different dimensions of human life and socio-economic
phenomena (under this broad view of capabilities as causal powers). The expansion of
human capabilities is the goal of social and economic policy, but capabilities are also
the causal powers that enable or constrain social change and economic production, and can
be explained in the context of underlying structures.
9. Concluding remarks
Interpreting Sen’s work as philosophical under-labouring for economics through elabo-
rating and clarifying social categories and concepts enables us to understand why sub-
stantive claims are often absent from his work. Sen’s main concern is to clarify concepts
such as well-being and advantage (suggesting categories such as functioning and capability
for that purpose), in order to under-labour for the development of substantive theories.
Nevertheless, one must also bear in mind that much of Sen’s analysis (for example, his
work on poverty, development and welfare) is also undertaken at a lower level of abstrac-
tion than perspectives such as critical realism in economics.
The social ontology conception that most coherently supports the notion of ‘capability’,
and other social categories to which Sen refers, is a structured ontology of capacities,
powers and potentials, in line with an open system conception of reality. Human beings
must be seen ‘as agents, rather than as motionless patients’, endowed with powers, capac-
ities and capabilities, since they are ‘active themselves’ (Sen, 1999B, p. 137). This onto-
logical category of ‘power’ not only clarifies Sen’s capability approach, it also helps us to
understand his other work (for example, his writings on rational behaviour and on socio-
economic development processes).
This interpretation of capabilities as causal powers also clarifies why these are both
means and ends of socio-economic development. They are (ethical) ends to the extent that
capabilities are the informational basis (or the relevant ‘space’) for assessing inequality—
and are, Sen argues, a more appropriate informational basis than ‘primary goods’,
‘resources’ or ‘utilities’. But capabilities are also the means to development, because they
are the causal powers (which arise in virtue of underlying structures) that enable change
and transformation.
Sen’s approach was first introduced in the context of welfare economics and political
philosophy (in opposition to mainstream welfare economics and moving beyond Rawlsian
political philosophy). Because of this, its ethical dimension has been much more scru-
tinised than its ontological and methodological underpinnings. But the contrast between
Sen’s approach and the mainstream approach exists not only in the context of ethical
analysis and welfare economics, but more generally, and at least as strikingly, in their
underlying ontological and methodological presuppositions.
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